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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
one time been a union representative, and subsequently had become a labor
relations consultant for various employers, in which capacity he had often opposed
the defendant's proposals. The Court nevertheless found that the purposes of
the union were not solely malicious, though no other possible reasons for the
action of the union were given by either the Court of Appeals or the Appellate
Division, so no recovery for the intentional injury to plaintiffs' property was
possible; i.e., there was justification for the union's action. The dissenters believed
tha the jury's findings of fact as to motive should not be upset; the majority
apparently believed that the jury's findings were completely unreasonable.
Defense to Libel Action
In Crane v. Telegram Corp.,54 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant falsely
published that he was "under indictment" and that this statement constituted a
libel, for which he requested compensatory and punitive damages. Truth was
pleaded as a complete and partial defense, in that the plaintiff was "indicted" in
a moral or non-legal sense; various individuals had accused the plaintiff of certain
crimes. The plaintiff challenged the legal sufficiency of the defenses under Rule
109 of the Rules of Civil Practice, and moved to strike them. Special Term
granted the motion, which was reversed by the Appellate Division5 5 but reinstated
by the Court of Appeals. The Court unanimously held that the defense of truth
of a charge different from that made in! the publication is insufficient.
Truth may be a complete or partial defense to a libel action,56 and must be
pleaded and proved by the defendant.5 7 In pleading justification the specific facts
and circumstances constituting the alleged truth must be set forth; a mete allega-
tion that the libellous matter is true is insufficient.58 It is well established that to
constitute a complete defense or justification, the truth must be co-extensive with
the alleged defamatory words,59 as construed in their ordinary and natural mean-
ing.60 A workable test is whether the libel as published would have a different
effect on the mind of the reader from that of the pleaded truth.61 A partial de-
54 308 N. Y. 470, 126 N. E. 2d 753 (1955).
55. 282 App. Div. 963, 126 N. Y. S. 2d 17 (2d Dep't 1953).
56. Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E.
209 (1926), held that any matter written or printed is libelous "if it tends to
expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induces
an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him
of their friendly intercourse in society."
57. Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27, 96 N. E. 84 (1911); Flickenstein v.
Friedman, 266 N. Y. 19, 193 N. E. 537 (1934).
58. Wolf v. Wolf, 198 Misc. 527, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 787 (1950); Meyers v. Husohle
Bros., 273 App. Div. 107, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (1st Dep't 1947).
59. White v. Barry, 288 N. Y. 37, 41 N. E. 2d 448 (1942); Flickenstein v.
Friedman, supra, note 57.
60. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N. Y. 94, 75 N. E. 2d 257 (1947); (afferty V.
Southern Tier Pub. Co., 226 N. Y. 87, 123 N. E. 76 (1919):
61, White v. Barry, supra, note 59.
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fense62 to mitigate punitive63 or reduce compensatory damages 4 may be inter-
posed where the facts tend but fail to prove the truth of the defamation.01 It is
to be noted that in pleading mitigation the particular circumstances must be
stated, including the sources of the defendant's information and the grounds for
his belief to show the absence of actual malice.66
The majority in the instant case reasoned that the defenses were insufficient,
since they tended to establish the truth of a statement different from that made
in the publication. The Court stated that "indictment" ordinarily refers to legal
process rather than to condemnation in a moral sense; the defense of truth,
based on the assumption that the jury could accept the broader meaning, must
fall, since it is not even related to the libelous matter.
Dismissal of Prima Facie Case Disallowed
In Flander v. City of Yonkers,67 plaintiff brought three causes of action 8
based on the wrongful shooting of plaintiff's intestate, allegedly in an effort by two
police officers to effect an arrest. The present appeal concerns itself only with
the cause of action based on negligence, which upon defendant's motion was
dismissed in the lower court; this was affirmed in the Appellate Division.6 9 The
Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that plaintiff need only establish a prima
facie case of negligence to take the case to the jury.
The weight of authority in this jurisdiction supports the proposition that
where there is a conflict of evidence, as in the present case, it is within the prov-
ince of the jury to decide on the issue of credibility and give appropriate weight
to the proffered evidence.70 It is equally well established that upon defendant's
motion to dismiss, the .trial court should for the purposes of the motion accept
plaintiff's evidence as true, and regard it in the most favorable light to determine
62. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 262 defines a partial defense as "matter tending
only to mitigate or reduce damages," and the section requires that It be desig-
nated as such in the answer.
63. Punitive damages are held to be available as to a libel published with
actual malice; the term includes also a carelessly published libel even If published
by an agent. Crave v. Bennett, 177 N. Y. 106, 69 N. E. 274 (1904).
64. Gressman. v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 197 N. Y. 474, 90 N. E. 1131 (1910);
Lanpher v. Clark, 149 N. Y. 472, 44 N. E. 182 (1896).
65. Ibid.
66. Flickenstein v. Friedman, supra, note 57.
67. 309 N. Y. 114, 127 N. E. 2d 838 (1955).
68. (a) action against the city for having knowingly and negligently em-
ployed unreliable police officers. (b) action for assault and battery. (c) action
for negligence against the police officers.
69. 283 App. Div. 970, 130 N. Y, S. 2d 895 (2d Dep't 1954).
70. Kraus v. Birnbavr , 200 N. Y. 130, 93 N. E. 474 (1910);,Meiselman v.
Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N. Y. 389, 34 N. E. 2d 367 (1941); acowsLk v. Long
Island3 R.R. Co., 292 N. Y. 448, 55 N. E. 2d 497 (1944).
